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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DIXIES. COX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MERVYN K. COX,
Defendant and Cross Appellant

Case No. 13242

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND REPLY
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO
DEFENDANT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
NATURE OF THE CASE.
The above entitled matter is a divorce action wherein
Plaintiff-Appellant, referred to hereinafter as Plaintiff, alleged
as grounds mental cruelty and asked for the care, custody and
control of the four minor children born as issue of the parties
subject to the Defendant having reasonable rights of visitation,
an equitable division of the property accumulated during the
marriage, reasonable child support, alimony, reasonable attorneys fees and costs of court. The Defendant and Cross Appellant,
hereinafter referred to as Defendant, filed a Counterclaim seeking divorce alleging as grounds mental cruelty, asking for the
custody of the minor children, seeking the creation of a Trust for
the minor children and asking that Plaintiff receive no alimony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 9, 1973 the Lower Court awarded the Defendant a Decree of Divorce from Plaintiff on the grounds of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cruelty. After finding both parties capable of having the care
and custody of the four minor children and expressing some
concern about the Plaintiffs plans to relocate to the State of
Idaho, the Court awarded the care and custody of the minor
children to the Defendant until August, 1973. Thereafter and on
the 5th day of October, 1973, the Court after full consideration
of the record awarded the custody of the minor children to the
Plaintiff subject to reasonable and full visitation rights by the
Defendant.
Consistent with granting custody of the minor children to
the Plaintiff, the Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the
sum of FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500.00) per month as
child support. The Lower Court awarded to Plaintiff a property
and alimony settlement in the total cash amount of $65,000.00,
which amount was to be reduced to $60,000.00 if paid within six
months, such sum being subsequently paid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks modification of the division of
property, child support payments and alimony and affirmation
of the Lower Court's decision regarding child custody.
Reversal of the Lower Court's decision relative to the care,
custody and control of the minor children as sought by the
Defendant-Cross Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The original complaint was filed by the Plaintiff, Dixie S.
Cox on April 5,1972 and an Amended Complaint was later filed
on April 10, 1972.
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The first Answer of the Defendant, Mervyn K. Cox was filed
on August 9, 1972, and on October 30, 1972 an answer to the
amended complaint and counter-claim was filed by the Defendant.
The evidence produced at a trial before the Court on
January 10, 11, and 12, 1973 produced the following:
The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on June 16,1961
in St. George, Utah, there having been born as issue of the
marriage four minor children. (Tr. 7)
Following their marriage the parties moved to San Francisco where Dr. Cox pursued his Dental Program. (Tr. 8, 380)
During the time of Dr. Cox's attending Dental School the
Plaintiff was employed in various capacities in an effort to meet
their living expenses. (Tr. 7,8) Subsequent to the Cox's moving
back to St. George, Utah in 1964, the Plaintiff worked in the
Office of the Defendant as a Receptionist and Assistant for a
period of three years and for a 8 year period subsequent to 1964
the Plaintiff was employed as a Bookkeeper for the Defendant at
a salary of $350.00 per month, which amount was deposited in a
Savings Account and as the Defendant's testimony indicated
was utilized to purchase the Bentley-Sullivan Farm. (Tr.
11,12,13,28,121,450451)
In the factual situation as outlined in the Defendant's Brief,
there are numerous references to certain relationships with
male companions; however, as the record clearly indicates,
there was no testimony elicited which would indicate immoral
conduct of the Plaintiff in the presence of the children.
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During the time that Mrs. Cox was continuing her education at Dixie College, reference was made to an occasion when
Dr. Cox found Mrs. Cox with another man in a parked car near
the College Library. (Tr. 106,390) Upon cross examination, the
Defendant admitted that they were sitting in the car talking
and that he observed nothing which would indicate any impropriety. (Tr. 431)
On another occasion testimony was illicited relative to
another man being in the Cox home clad only in Bermuda
Shorts. (Tr. 390) The testimony further indicated that the man
was a Hawaiian who was one of two renters in the Basement
Apartment and that the renters often ate with the Coxes and
were apparently welcome in the home. (Tr. 431,432)
The transcript further reveals a concerted effort by the
Defendant to attempt to show that Plaintiff had neglected the
children primarily by leaving them with Babysitters. During
the month of June, 1972, Plaintiff was absent from the home for
a ten day period of time. (Tr. 90,122) This ten day period of time
was a time of sole-searching by mutual agreement of the parties
to determine whether or not their martial difficulties could be
settled. (Tr. 89) During this period of time, the Plaintiff kept in
close touch with several people in an effort to determine the
problems which the children might be experiencing.(Tr. 89,90)
Proper arrangements had been made to secure the services of a
qualified sitter for the children so that they were well cared for
over that period of time. (Tr. 435) The testimony further indicated that the Plaintiff was particular about whom she selected
to babysit the children and that she made every effort to insure
there was adequate food in the house, that the children had
extra spending money, that they had the names of individuals
who they could contact for help and that a schedule was pre-
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pared setting forth the respective days and time in regard to the
schedule of each child. (Tr. 126)
The evidence proportedly disclosed that during a six month
period in 1972 Mrs. Cox spent 80 out of 100 days away from the
children, leaving the children on these occasions with babysitters. (Tr. 301, 313, 322) Upon cross examination, however, the
witness who disclosed such evidence stated that on many occasions what she in fact termed to be babysitting were in fact
occasions when the Plaintiffs children were playing with the
witnesses children and that the babysitting frequently involved
only short periods of time. (Tr. 285,287,313) This witness
further testified that the Plaintiff and she were friends, and
frequently exchanged babysitting services. (Tr. 285)
Reference is also made to a trip to Boise, Idaho in December
of 1972 wherein Mrs. Cox stayed overnight with the children in
a Mobile Home with her boyfriend. (Tr. 101) The seventeen year
old sister of the Plaintiff accompanied Mrs. Cox to Boise on that
occasion and there was no testimony which indicated that the
Plaintiff conducted herself in an improper manner. (Tr. 125)
Reference is also made to numerous other occasions and Mrs.
Cox allegedly spent time with the same male companion. (Tr.
96,98,99,101,114, 267-269) As the record clearly indicates,
however, the testimony received relative to these occasions did
not establish that the Plaintiff categorically denied having
stayed with this same man at the Tri-Arc Travel Lodge in Salt
Lake City and there was no proof to the contrary. (Tr. 93,94)
The testimony further indicated that on occasions when this
same man stayed at her home in St. George, that he stayed in
the guest room downstairs, such testimony being uncontroverted that nothing immoral took place between the parties.
(Tr. 94)
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Testimony at the Trial Court revealed t h a t the defendant
had been undergoing psychiatric care, having been diagonized
as emotionally distressed and depressed and as part of the
t r e a t m e n t was placed on a prescribed drug. (Tr. 438)
The evidence further disclosed t h a t the Defendant expressed an unusal interest in female persons other than his wife.
(Tr. 438,439,450,452) The Defendant testified t h a t on or about
December 10, 1972 he telephoned London, England ostensibly
to speak with a former female employee in an effort to ascertain
whether or not she would provide Defendant with an Affidavit
as to their relationship. (Tr. 452) On another occasion, the
Defendant in the absence of his wife proceeded to teach the
Plaintiffs Sister, then 15V2 years of age how to dance and proceeded to dance in such a manner to cause her to become uncomfortable and request to be taken home. (Tr. 454) The testimony
further indicated t h a t rather t h a n taking her directly home, the
Defendant parked the automobile and proceeded to kiss the
young lady. (Tr. 455)
The evidence discloses t h a t the older children have on occasion inquired as to "why's Daddy treating us so mean," and t h a t
the Defendant has further upset the children in removing them
from school during their reading period. (Tr. 30,31) Further
testimony clearly established t h a t the Plaintiff takes great interest in her children, in taking the children hiking and picnicing, participating in numerous other events with the children,
a n d a s s i s t i n g t h e m in t h e i r r e a d i n g a n d s t u d i e s . (Tr.
234,235,240) In fact, the Plaintiff was rather insistent t h a t any
plans she might have had would have to wait until she finished
reading to the children and they finished with their studies. The
witness who provided this testimony visited the Cox home at a
frequency of approximately 2 or 3 times per week and testified
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the house to be clean, the children well dressed and the meals
balanced and nutritious. (Tr. 240,241)
The testimony of the Home Teacher indicated that the
interior of the Cox Home, particularly the living room and
kitchen were very clean on numerous occasions when he visited
the Cox Home, including two occasions when he arrived unannounced. (Tr. 457,458) He further testified that the children
were clean and well dressed and that there appeared to be
harmony and love between Mrs. Cox and the children. (Tr. 458)
The evidence adduced at the trial court level established
that the parties have accumulated since their marriage the
following described real and personal property:
1. The Home located in St. George, Utah, having a value of as
established by the Esplin Appraisal Service in the sum of
$74,500.00, with approximately $500.00 due for improvements on said home at the time of the trial. (Tr. 161,403) This
value was arrived at utilizing the market data approach,
together with the replacement cost less depreciation and by
comparison to comparable sales. (Tr. 151,152,155,156,157,
159, 161)
That the market date and comparable sales approach was
also utilized in determining the value of the Bentley-Sullivan
Farm which the Esplin Appraisal Service valued at
$104,420.00. (Tr. 161-165) According to testimony given by the
Defendant, there was an indebtedness of $22,000.00 owing on
the Bentley portion of the Farm and $16,000.00 owing on the
Sullivan portion of the Farm leaving a net value of $66,420.00.
(Tr. 407,408)
Utilizing the comparable sales approach, the Syphus Farm
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was appraised at a vlue of $181,000.00. (Tr. 166-169) The original purchase price of the property was $120,000.00, the parties
owning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest therein. (Tr. 405)
The Defendant testified that there was an encumbrance against
the property in the amount of $104,000.00, the net equity interest of the parties based on one-third of the net equity of
$77,000.00 being in the sum of $25,600.00.
By Stipulation of the parties it was determined that the
one-third interest of the parties in the Car Wash Property had a
value of $9,730.00. (Tr. 147,148) The parties further stipulated
that the property referred to as the Service Station and Business
Building Complex located at Kemp Corners had a value based
on the Esplin Appraisal Report of $62,398.00. Counsel for the
respective parties stipulated that the encumbrance due on the
Kemp Corners Property was in the sum of $31,897.00, leaving a
net value of $30,502.00 of which the parties own a one-half (1/2)
interest valued at $15,251.00. (Tr. 210,404) Counsel for the
respective parties stipulated as to the value of the Pine Valley
Property at $3,200.00 and Kolob lots at $6,000.00. (Tr. 148)
The Defendant testified that the value of the parties oneseventh (1/7) equity interest in the Prince Medical Complex was
in the sum of $10,000.00. (Tr. 411) The Defendant also testified
as to the value of the 1972 Chevrolet Stationwagon in the
amount of $4,500.00, the 1970 Buick Riveria Automobile in the
amount of $2,000.00, the 1969 Ford Pickup in the sum of
$1,500.00, the Boat and Trailer in the sum of $1,800.00, the
one-fourth (XA) interest in an Airplane in the sum of $2,400.00,
the 2 Snow Mobiles together with trailer in the sum of
$1,000.00, the Trackster in the sum of $1,000.00, a Promissory
Note from Howard Carter with an unpaid balance of $20,000.00
at 5% interest per annum, a Promissory Note from John Whitney with an unpaid balance of $30,000.00 with interest thereon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at the rate of 5% per annum, a Convertible Bond in the sum of
$8,000.00, U & I Sugar Stock in the sum of $200.00, American
Western Life Insurance Stock valued at $600.00, Freedom Holding Company Stock the value of which was unknown, a membership in the Bloomington Country Club having a value of
$300.00, Dental Equipment situated within the Defendant's
Office having a value of $6,000.00 and a Savings Account in the
St. George Savings and Loan in the amount of $2,300.00. (Tr.
410-415)
Taking into consideration the respective values established
by the evidence and stipulation of Counsel less the respective
encumbrances, the property accumulated by the parties during
the period of their marriage has a value of $292,101.00.
There was additional testimony concerning the
Defendant's participation in a Keogh Retirement Plan; however, there does not appear any estimate as to the accrued value
of the Plan at the time of the filing of the Complaint. (Tr. 27)
The uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff established
that she and her children need approximately $1,019.00 per
month to maintain the standard of living to which they have
been accustomed. (Tr. 26,27) The testimony elicited in the
Lower Court indicated that the Defendant, an Orthodontist, has
a substantial annual income together with the properties set
forth herein having substantial income producing qualities.
(Tr. 21,25,354,356,357,358,359)
Subsequent to the trial, counsel for the respective parties,
at the Trial Courts request, submitted Memorandums of Points
and Authorities. On February 9, 1973, the Trial Court having
some concern in regard to the propriety and judgment of some of
the actions concerning a male companion of the Plaintiff and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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position that he placed the Plaintiff in, the Court awarded the
temporary care, custody and control of the minor children of the
parties to the Defendant and Counter-Claimant until the month
of August, 1973. As the Court indicated the Plaintiff had testified as to her intention and desire to vacate Washington
County and move to Boise, Idaho for the purposes of marrying
the man as soon as such marriage might be legally possible. As a
result thereof, the Court expressed concern about taking the
minor children from Washington County in the immediate future and introducing them into a new home, Mrs. Cox having
testified it was her intention to marry this man. (February 9,
1973; (Tr. 4,5) The Court further found that Mrs. Dixie Cox was
a fit Mother; however, it was the desire of the Court to give her
an opportunity to stabalize her life during the interim period of
time, having in mind the presumption under Utah Law that the
Mother is presumed to be the custodian of the children in the
best interest of the children. (February 9,1973; 3,5) The Court
further ordered a property and alimony settlement payable to
the Plaintiff, by the Defendant in the amount of $65,000.00,
such amount to be secured by a First Lien on the Home belonging to the parties and provided that the property settlement and
alimony payment was effected within six months it was to be
reduced by $5,000.00, resulting in a $60,000.00 cash settlement.
(February 9,1973 Tr. 6) In addition, the Plaintiff was awarded
the 1972 Stationwagon Automobile, together with her personal
belongings and Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum
of $2,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and costs of court.
(Februaiy 9, 1973; Tr. 7)
The Court further required that the Defendant pay Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per month for a period of six months to
assist Plaintiff in relocating to Idaho. (February 9,1973; Tr. 6)
The total sum of $6,000.00 was subsequently paid and on February 18,1974 the balance of $54,000.00 paid by the Defendant
to the Plaintiff was ordered placed in escrow by the Clerk of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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District Court pending appeal of the property settlement.
Following the consideration by the Lower Court of the
Plaintiffs Motion for an in-kind distribution to Plaintiff of the
assets of the parties in regard to awarding the Carter and
Whitney Promissory Note proceeds and the Bentley-Sullivan
Farm to Plaintiff, which testimony indicated was adjacent to a
farm owned by the Plaintiffs Father (Tr. 443) and consideration of Plaintiffs and Defendants recapitulation on values of
property holdings and Plaintiffs objections to the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interlocutory Decree of Divorce
in regard to the Trial court's lump sum alimony and property
award, the trial court on the 14th day of December issued a
Memorandum Decision affirming the property settlement as set
forth by the Court in its ruling of February 9,1973. Without the
benefit of a transcript, the Lower Court found the net assets of
the parties subject to division and distribution to be in the sum
of $209,743.00, which the Court rounded off to $210,000.00.
(Mem. Dec. 2) The Court divided that sum by one-third which
amounted to $62,762.76, awarding to Plaintiff a net property
and alimony settlement of $65,000.00 together with the 1972
Station Wagon having an agreed value of $4,500.00 making a
total award of $69,500.00. (Mem. Dec. 2) The Court further
stated that in the event the Defendant elected to pay the cash
award over a 10 year period at 7% interest per annum consistent
with the previous Court Order entered on February 9,1973, the
value to Plaintiff would be approximately $90,540.00. (Mem.
Dec. 3)
After referring to factors considered by the Court in making
the property settlement award, the lower Court utilizing the
recapitulation of assets submitted by the Plaintiff indicated
that one-third of $290,000.00 would be in the sum of $87,087.00,
which amount the trial court felt must be discounted by a
maximum of one-fourth or a minimum of one-fifth. (Mem. Dec.
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4) Discounting $87,087.00 by one-fourth the Court calculated
the present day award or equity to be $65,135.00 and discounting $87,087.00 by the minimum of one-fifth the trial court
determined the present day equity to be $69,670.00, both
amounts which the trial court felt to be comparable to the
$69,500.00 award made by the Court. (Mem. Dec. 4)
The Decree of Divorce was entered on December 24, 1973,
the divorce having become final on that date pursuant to an
order of the trial court made on October 5, 1973, neither party
having appealed the granting the divorce. (October 5,1974; 27)
A Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by the Defendant Mervyn K. Cox on January 21, 1974. The Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Appeal January 22, 1974.
ISSUES.
The issue presented in the Cross-Appeal concerns whether
the trial court erred in granting the care, custody and control of
the minor children to the Plaintiff— Mother, together with the
attendant of the award of child support.
The issue raised on the Appeal by Plaintiff concerns
whether the Lower Court erred in its ruling regarding the lump
sum alimony and property settlement award.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
TO THEIR MOTHER.
In divorce cases the trial court has considerable discretion
in determing what is equitable, and, upon appeal, the decision of
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the court as to child custody will not be reversed unless it is clear
that there was an abuse of discretion. Graziano v. Graziano, 7
Utah 2d 187, 321 P. 2d 931, (1958); Sartain v. Sartain, 15 Utah
2d 198,389 P.2d 1023 (1964); Sampsell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73,202
P.2d 550, (1949). The reason most often expressed for this rule is
that the trial court is in an advantaged position to observe the
witnesses and draw conclusions. As was said in Sampsell v.
Holt, at 202 P.2d 554:
rr

We are not disposed to upset that finding. The trial court
had the opportunity, as we do not, of seeing the parties and
the witnesses, of observing their demeanor, and of forming
opinions."
Therefore, unless it can be shown that the mother is unfit, it
is proper to leave the children in her custody.
A. The preferences in Utah is for children of tender years to
remain with their mother.
The Court has often expressed the philosophy that children
of a young age are better left under the mother's care than the
father's. The Court has said that, all things being equal, the
mother is in an advantaged position over the father when it
comes to child custody. McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393,
384 P.2d 961 (1963); Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273,293 P.2d
418, (1956);Briggs w.Briggs, 111 Utah 488,181 P.2d 223 (1947).
Unless the mother is demonstrated unfit to be a mother, this
preference exists.
B. The Plaintiff has not been shown to be unfit as a mother.
Several cases, both in Utah and elsewhere, have reached
the conclusion that to be a good mother one need not be a good
wife.
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In Ryan v. Ryan, 17 U t a h 2d 44, 404 P.2d 247 (1965), it is
true t h a t the Court upheld an award to the father. However, it
was doing this in observance of the rule that, unless abuse of
discretion is shown, the ruling of the trial court will not be upset
on appeal. Although the evidence did show the wife had been
engaged in love affairs, was continually away from home, and
failed to care for the children, the Court did not deem this
conduct immoral. At 404 P.2d 248, it said:
"While the evidence contained in the record before us does
not seem to warrant the court's findings that the Plaintiff
(wife) is an immoral person, he nevertheless had the parties
before him, witnessed their dismeanor and could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was not a fit or proper person to
have custody of the children. . . . While some other judge
may have found otherwise we cannot say that the trial court
acted unreasonably or abused its discretion."
It is clear t h a t the Court's decision was based on observance
of the rule stated above. This is even more clear when it is
remembered t h a t in Ryan the father had been convicted of two
serious felonies, and the Court wondered who cared for the
children while he was in prison.
The proposition t h a t one can be a good mother but a poor
wife was expressed in Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U t a h 2d 105, 388
P.2d 230, (1964). The Supreme Court in Dearden, without disturbing the District Court finding of adulterous conduct by the
mother and the finding t h a t she was frequently absent from
home and in the company of other men, concluded t h a t this did
not exhibit any base, depraved or erratic attitude toward the
child and refused to grant custody of the child to the father. In
the case ofStuber v. Stuber, 121 U t a h 632, 244 P.2d 650, (1952),
the mother was living with a married man at the time of the
trial. There, also, the Court upheld the award of custody of the
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children to the mother. On the basis ofDearden and Stuber, the
Court affirmed the decree granting custody of the children to
the mother in the case of Sparks v. Sparks, 29 Utah 2d 263, 508
P.2d 531, (1973). In that case, the mother was living with
another man, to whom she was not married, while she had
custody of the children from her former marriage.
Even more forcefully in support of this position that a good
mother can be a poor wife are cases where the mother's adultery
is not merely suspected but actually proven. In Cooke v. Cooke,
67 Utah 371, 248 p 83, (1926), the wife was adjudged guilty of
adultery by a Canadian Court. The Utah Supreme Court said
that, though the Canadian decision as to adultery was to receive
full faith and credit, it did not deprive the mother of custody of
the children. At 248 P 102 it said:
rr

In this country the general rule is that a spouse, though
found or adjudged guilty of adultery, will not, for such
reason, necessarily be deprived of the care and custody of
his or her children."
Further, it was said that the unfitness which deprives a parent
of custody must be positive, not contemplative or comparative.
Our sister state of Nevada has expressly held that adultery will
not disqualify the mother in custody matters. In Cooley v.
Cooley, 86 Nev. 220, 467 P.2d 103, (1970), the Nevada court
upheld an award of custody to the mother, even though she had
lived with her paramour for a month, during which time the
children, ages 8 and 10, were present in the home. In so ruling,
the Court expressly overruled Sisson v. Sisson, 77 Nev. 478,367
P.2d 98, (1961), where the Court had reversed the trial court's
award of child custody to the mother under similar circumstances. In footnote 2 of Cooley, it was said:
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rr

2. We expressly overrule any views in Sisson, supra, which
may be inconsistent with those herein."
In Chase v. Chase, 15 Utah 2d 81, 387 P.2d 556 (1963) the
District Court ordered the custody of a 2^2 year old boy previously granted to the mother to be granted to the father. In
reversing the award of custody to the father the Supreme Court
stated:
"Except for understandable human frailties, practically her
only dereliction of consequence which might directly affect
the child is that of leaving him with Plaintiffs mother, or in
a nursing home, while she worked. This is not necessarily
inimical to his welfare" Id. at 556.
The Court further stated:
r

lt is a universally recognized principle, well grounded in
reason and experience, that a child of such tender years
should be in the care of his mother unless there is some
substantial and compelling reason to deprive her of custody" Id at 556.
The evidence in this case clearly does not demonstrate any
substantial or compelling reason to deprive Mrs. Cox of custody
of the children. The evidence has disclosed t h a t Mrs. Cox has
always taken great interest in the children and participated in
numerous activities with them, including among others, hiking, picnicing, cooking and assisting them in their reading and
studies. (Tr. 234,235,240) The evidence further indicated Mrs.
Cox to keep the house clean, the children well dressed and serve
well balanced and nutritious meals. (Tr. 146,147,240,241,457,
458)
The record clearly indicates the total lack of any conclusive
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evidence demonstrating any immoral conduct on the part of the
Plaintiff in the presence of the children.
Reference has been made to the numerous occasions when
the children were left with babysitters, The testimony clearly
indicates t h a t on most occasions they were left with babysitters
for only a short period of time, many times of babysitting being
in reality only playtime with the neighbor children. (Tr.
285,287,313) Reference was further made to a 10 day period,
which by agreement of the parties was a period of soul searching. (Tr. 89) The Plaintiff, contrary to the representations of the
Defendant, kept in close touch with several people over t h a t
period of time to ascertain how the children were. At no time
was it demonstrated t h a t the Plaintiff was negligent in selecting babysitters to care for the children. On the contrary, the
Plaintiff made every effort to insure there was adequate food in
the house, t h a t the children had extra spending money, t h a t
they had the names of persons who they could contact for help
and t h a t a schedule for each child was prepared to assist the
babysitter. (Tr. 126) It is significant t h a t during the 9 month
period between the filing of the divorce and the trial t h a t the
Father did not institute any proceedings to secure temporary
custody and was apparently satisfied t h a t the children were
being well cared for.
Many of the cases cited by the Defendant are distinquishable from the facts of the case at bar. In Francks v. Francks, 21
U t a h 2d 180,442 P.2d 937 (1968) the evidence demonstrated the
Mother to have traveled about the streets late at night in an
intoxicated condition and t h a t the 11 year old child of the parties during the trial requested that his custody be awarded to his
Father. Such a factual situation does not appear in this case. In
McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393, 384 P.2d 961 (1963) the
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evidence indicated the Mother to use unseemly language in the
presence of the children, to keep obscene materials within the
reach of the children, leaving home on numerous occasions
arriving home late and in an intoxicated condition, spending an
inordinate amount of time in Taverns and persistently refusing
and neglecting to engage in activities with the children. In the
instant case such conduct on the part of the Mother clearly does
not appear in the record. In Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d. 429, 454
P.2d 884 (1969) the mother was proven emotionally unstable
and prior to the divorce left a baby 13 months old, purportedly
for a two week vacation, failing to return until a five and one
half month period had elapsed. The facts in the case at bar
present no similiarity to the Hyde case.
SUMMARY
While as the trial court stated it may be true that some of
Mrs. Coxes actions may be lacking in propriety and judgment,
the cases are clear that that situation, or even outright adultery, will not render the mother unfit to have the custody of her
children. The cases are unanimous in proclaiming that unless
such unfitness is shown, or an abuse of discretion by the trial
court manifested, the Court will not reverse the lower court's
ruling on appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial
court be affirmed and that the custody of the four minor children
remain with their Mother, who as the evidence indicates is a fit
and proper person to have their care, custody and control.
POINT II.
THE PROPERTY AND ALIMONY SETTLEMENT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNJUST AND
INEQUITABLE.
It is well settled that, as property division decisions are
equitable proceedings, upon appeal the Supreme Court may
review both law and facts. Constitution of Utah, art. 8, par. 9,
Dahlberg v.Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214, (1930); Steed v.
Steed, 54 Utah 244, 181 P 445, (1919); Clawson v. Wallace, 16
Utah 300, 52 P 9, (1898).
A. The wife is generally entitled to one-third of the property.
In Griffen v. Griff en, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84, (1898), the Court
expressed the general rule that, upon divorce, the wife takes
one-third of the property of the marriage. However, this is not
an absolute rule; it depends, in each case, on the particular facts
and the equities of the situation. For example, in Woolley v.
Woolley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743, (1948), the wife was
awarded about one-third of the property, but she was not given
any part of some mining interest which her husband owned. The
Court found this to be error because it denied her the right to
share in the possible increase in the stock's value. Therefore, the
Court ordered the trial court to keep continuing jurisdiction in
order to increase the award in the event the stock went up.
Where the wife has contributed to the marriage in substantial part, she is entitled to more than one-third. In Lundgreen v.
Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, 184 P.2d 670, (1947), the husband
purchased a home for $395.00. The wife spent part of her funds,
and a considerable amount of time, in remodelling and decorating the house. The trial court granted the wife the furniture,
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some of which she had owned prior to the marriage, and some of
which they had accumulated after the marriage. The Court
found this to be error, saying she should have been given onehalf the value of the house in excess of $395.00. If, in addition to
contributing to the marriage, the wife's earning ability has not
increased while the husband's has, the wife may be entitled to as
much as 80%. In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483,211 P.2d
452, (1949), the Court found no error in an award to the wife of
$1,651.00 out of $2,057.00. The Court noted that the wife had
been employed throughout the marriage while the husband had
attended school, and his earning ability had been substantially
increased while hers, at best, had remained the same. A similar
case isPinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,67 P.2d 265, (1937). There,
after a marriage of only four years, the wife was given
$2,000.00, one-half the total $4,000.00 the couple owned. It was
noted that she had been a store clerk prior to the marriage, but
had given up her job, and any hopes of advancement, upon
marriage.
B. The purpose in dividing property is to permit the parties
to reconstruct their lives.
It was said in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977,
(1955), that the purpose in property division is to permit reconstruction of lives. Except in marriages of extremely short duration, where neither's economic position has been substantially
altered, this does not mean placing the parties as they were
before marriage. In Wilson, the husband and wife had been
married for 15 years, during which time the husband earned
between $80.00 and $300.00 per month, but always enough to
keep them comfortable. The Court affirmed an award to the wife
of the house, valued at $19,000.00 to $20,000.00, with a
$9,352.74 mortgage; a second home valued between $4,000.00
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and $5,000.00; stock worth $545.90; a joint bank account of
$827.39; and a tax check of $161.10. It said that the wife was
entitled to some compensation for her 15 years of service to her
husband. InBullen v.Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P 292, (1928), the
husband had inherited $25,000.00 in property from his father,
which, at the time of the divorce was subject to $5,000.00 in
debts. Even though the wife had contributed nothing in the way
of accumulating the property, she was awarded $2,250.00, and
the husband was directed to pay $3,150.00 in notes jointly
signed by both.
Since the purpose of property division is to reconstruct
lives, the question to be answered in determining if the division
was sufficient is not can the parties sustain themselves, but can
they maintain themselves in the manner to which they are
accustomed.Ring v.Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973).
In that case, during the marriage both the husband and wife
were employed as practicing physicians. The husband earned
about $29,000.00 per year in private practice, while she earned
$7,000.00 with the public health department. Upon divorce, she
was granted alimony of $600.00 per month and child support of
$200.00 per month. She then moved to San Francisco, where she
began to earn about $26,000.00 per year. The trial court then
reduced the alimony to $1.00 per year. The Supreme Court
reversed, saying that much of her new earnings were likely
eaten up by increased expenses, and, though she could very
easily survive, her lifestyle would not be that to which she had
become accustomed.
In divorce cases, the wife is entitled to at least one-third of
the property, as a rule of thumb. This is increased depending on
the circumstances, especially if the wife has contributed to the
accumulation of property, or had her earning ability impaired
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by the marriage. Even if she has done neither, she may be
entitled to more as compensation for her years of service.
In Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928, (1968),
the Court awarded the wife one-half of the accumulated assets.
In Weaver, similar to the case presented here, the Defendant
was a physician specializing in Urology and from his practice
and by careful management accumulated assets of approximately $250,000.00. Largely through the growth of stock an
additional asset accumulation of $500,000.00 resulted. A large
portion of the stock was acquired by the husband by purchasing
or as gifts from his father and sister. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld an equal division of the assets.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14 Utah 2d. 24, 376 P.2d 547
(1963), the Supreme Court upheld a trial court award of a half
interest in a home of the parties, the rental property, a substantial life insurance policy on the husband, a country club membership and some personal property. In addition to a one-half
interest in the above mentioned property, the husband was
ordered to pay $1,250.00 per month alimony to the wife, notwithstanding that all of the children had reached the age of
majority and that never during the marriage had the wife been
a breadwinner. In upholding the decision of the District Court,
the Supreme Court stated:
rr

It is apparent from the Court's distribution of the property
that the husband was left with the wherewithal to continue
producing a substantial sum of money and also substantial
interests in real and personal property were allowed to be
retained by him, so that it does not appear he will be greatly
hindered in the mode of living to which he has accustomed
himself The wife has been given some income producing
property, as well as alimony, so that she can continue living
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in the style to which she has become accustomed during the
marriage. Under such circumstances, this Court cannot say
that there has been a plain course of discretion or that the
awards are unjust or inequitable/' Id at 548.
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions indicated
t h a t consideration must be given to all of the attendant facts
and circumstances including: the duration of the marriage; the
ages of the parties; their social positions and respective standards of living; considerations relative to the children; the
money and property possessed by the parties and its manner of
acquisition; the training and capabilities of the respective parties and their present and potential incomes. Wilson v. Wilson, 5
U t a h 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U t a h 255,
67 P.2d 265 (1937); Allen v. Allen, 109 U t a h 99, 165 P. 2d 872
(1946). The facts in the present case indicate that the parties have
accumulated since their marriage assets aggregating a value of
$292,101.00.
(Tr. 147, 148, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159,
161-165,166-169,210,
404,405,411, 410-415) In reviewing the
Memorandum Decision issued by the Trial Court, we note t h a t
the Trial Judge indicated t h a t he did not have the benefit of a
transcript in arriving at the value of $210,000.00. The record
clearly indicates t h a t the value of the assets accumulated by the
parties totals $292,101.00. Based upon the Trial Court's determination t h a t the Plaintiff was entitled to an alimony and
property settlement of one-third, the net property settlement
due to the Plaintiff would be in the sum of $97,367.00. The Trial
Court, in its Memorandum Decision of December 14, 1973,
indicated t h a t dividing $290,000.00 by one-third as Plaintiffs
share would be $87,087.00. (Mem. Dec. 4) The Trial Court's
determination as to a one-third value of $290,000.00 appears to
be in error, one-third of $290,000.00 being in the sum of
$96,667.00. The Trial Court further indicated t h a t the one-third
figure must be discounted by a maximum of one-fourth or by a
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minimum of one-fifth (Mem. Dec. 4) Discounting the one-third
by the maximum figure, Plaintiffs present day equity would be
$72,500.00 or discounting the one-third figure by the minimum
figure of one-fifth, Plaintiffs award would be $77,334.00. We
can find no case authority purporting the propriety of reducing
the equity figures by the maximum or minimum amounts cited
in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. Assuming the properties were ordered sold or awarded in-kind consistent with
Plaintiffs Motion for an in-kind Distribution, the Plaintiffs
present day equity would be substantially near the figure of
$96,667.00.
The record fully substantiates the contribution of the
Plaintiff relative to the accumulated assets of the parties. The
Plaintiff worked on a full time basis in various capacities in an
effort to defray living expenses while Dr. Cox attended Dental
School. (Tr. 7,8) Subsequent to the Coxes moving to St. George in
1964, Mrs. Cox worked in the office of Dr. Cox as a Receptionist
and Assistant for a period of three years, for an eight year period
subsequent to 1964, Mrs. Cox was employed as a Bookkeeper for
the Defendant, MervynK. Cox, at a salary of $350.00 per month,
which amount was deposited in a Savings Account and as the
Defendant's testimony indicated was utilized to purchase the
Bentley-Sullivan
Farm, having a net value of $66,420.00. (Tr.
11,12, 13, 28, 121, 407, 408, 450, 451) The testimony further
indicated that the Bentley-Sullivan Farm is adjacent to a Farm
owned by the Plaintiffs Family, which would have been conducive to an in-kind distribution of the assets by the Trial Court.
(Tr. 443) Inasmuch as the salary of the Plaintiff was utilized to
acquire the Bentley-Sullivan Farm, it would appear reasonable
t h a t the Trial Court should have awarded an in-kind distribution of the assets, including the Carter and Whitney Promissory
Notes which could be utilized in retiring the encumbrances
remaining to be paid on the Bentley-Sullivan Farm.
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The evidence clearly indicates that the Defendant has a
substantial income producing ability. The parties had a taxable
income of $21,837.00 in 1969, $25,465.00 in 1970 and
$17,869.07 in 1971. (Tr. 356,357,358)
As the Supreme Court has reiterated in numerous decisions, the primary purpose of a property division is to reconstruct lives, the question to be analyzed in determining the
sufficiency of a property division being not whether the parties
can sustain themselves, but can they maintain themselves in
the manner to which they are accustomed. The uncontroverted
testimony of the Plaintiff established that she and her children
need approximately $1,019.00 per month to maintain the standard of living to which they have been accustomed. (Tr. 26, 27)
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is difficult to
understand how the Plaintiff can continue to maintain that
standard of living on a child support allowance of $500.00 per
month and a cash alimony and property settlement in the
amount of $60,000.00. As the Court indicated in the Ring Case
much of the wife's new earnings were likely to be eaten up by
increased expenses. In these inflationary times, it is not difficult
to foresee that the costs and expenses of supporting and maintaining a standard of living to which the Plaintiff and her
children have been accustomed will necessitate an invasion into
the cash alimony and property settlement awarded by the Trial
Court.
The Defendant, on the other hand, should have little difficulty in maintaining the standard of living to which he has been
accustomed. As the evidence clearly indicates, he possesses
substantial income producing ability and pursuant to the award
made by the Trial Court has substantial interest in other real
and personal properties, including the Carter and Whitney
Promissory Notes aggregating receivables in the amount of
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$50,000.00 plus interest. The testimony further indicates the
r e a l properties, including t h e K e m p Corners P r o p e r t i e s ,
Apartment in the home, Farm Properties and Car Wash Property, to have substantial income producing capabilities. The
lump sum alimony and property settlement award to Plaintiff
has little income producing ability, save and except investment
interest thereon which will provide little hedge against inflationary expenses.
SUMMARY
Depending on the circumstances, particularly such as those
in the instant case where the wife has contributed to the accumulation of property or had her earning ability impaired, the
Court has been inclined to award an equal division of the accumulated assets.
We respectfully submit t h a t the Judgment of the Lower
Court regarding the lump sum alimony and property settlement
be reversed and modified to the extent t h a t Plaintiff receive the
Bentley-Sullivan Farm Property together with the Carter and
Whitney Promissory Notes which can be utilized to pay the
respective encumbrances, the 1972 Chevrolet Station Wagon
and such additional cash award as in the Courts J u d g m e n t will
approximate an equal division of the aggregate net cash value of
the accumulated assets of the parties and to the extent t h a t the
Defendant receive the home located in St. George, Utah, the
Syphus Farm, the one-third equity interest of the parties in the
Car Wash Property, the Kemp Corners Property including the
service station and building complex located thereon, the Kolob
and Pine Valley Lots, the one-seventh equity interest of the
parties in the Prince Medical Complex, the Buick Automobile,
the Ford Pickup, the Boat and Trailer, the one-fourth interest in
the Airplane, the 2 Snowmobiles and Trackster, the Convertible
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Bond, the U & I Sugar Stock, the American Western Life Insurance Stock, the Freedom Holding Company Stock, the
Bloomington Country Club Membership, the Dental Equipment and the Savings Account in the St. George Savings &
Loan.
Respectfully Submitted
CLINE JACKSON & MAYER

Joseph E. Jackson
Attorney's for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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